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The Social Nature of Boards* 
Rakesh Khurana† 
Katharina Pick‡ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Still reeling from a series of high-profile and extremely 
costly corporate scandals involving dysfunctional board 
behavior, lawmakers and scholars are scrambling to make 
sense of the gaps in understanding that clearly exist in 
governance research. Inevitably, these scandals provoked a 
surfeit of Monday-morning quarterback explanations. Some 
argued that these problems should have been anticipated as 
the inevitable consequence of the proliferation of high-powered 
pay-for-performance plans.1 Others talked about investors’ 
misplaced faith in a firm’s stock price as an indicator of 
corporate governance quality.2 Ironically, the same fields of 
finance and law that are now offering these retrospective 
judgments previously advocated increased stock option grants 
and an unyielding faith in the efficiency of the stock market.3 
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 1 See L.A. BEBCHUK & J.M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 159-62 (2004). 
 2 See Michael C. Jensen et al., Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We 
Got to Here, What are the Problems, and How to Fix Them (2004) 15-21 (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=561305. 
1259 
 3 See, e.g., Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Firm Performance and 
Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems Between Managers and Shareholders, 31 J. 
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As well-intentioned and wise as many of these 
judgments are, we cannot help but feel that they perpetuate a 
false understanding as to the nature of boards. At the root of 
this finance and law perspective is the assumption that 
directors are fully motivated to act in the interests of the firm 
and its shareholders only when they have an individual 
interest to do so. Advocates of this perspective have argued, for 
example, that without financial inducements such as stock 
options or share grants, directors “have little incentive to 
extend themselves beyond relatively superficial oversight of 
their firms’ affairs. They mechanically fulfill their specified 
duties (certain approvals and audits) and watch for egregious 
derailments, but not much more.”4 Much of the corporate 
governance research and prescription of the last twenty or 
more years is rooted in this individualistic explanation of board 
and director behavior.5 
We believe that the dominating focus on individual 
director incentives in governance scholarship misses a critical 
element of director behavior. As we will argue in this paper, a 
board is not a simple aggregation of individuals but is, in fact, a 
complex social system and must be understood as such. 
Financial considerations do not figure centrally in shaping a 
director’s behavior, particularly as it relates to boardroom 
culture. In fact, directors are highly cognizant of their 
membership, not only on a particular board, but also as 
members of a broader community.6 They have a clear sense of 
their own boundaries—how far their territory extends, who 
belongs, and who does not. The actions of a board, therefore, 
cannot be understood as being the aggregate product of each 
individual director’s behavior. Rather, their actions express the 
sum of connections and relationships of a group. 
We know from decades of research on groups that they 
are enormously powerful social environments.7 Group 
  
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 377 (1996); M.C. Jensen & K.J. Murphy, Performance 
Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990).  
 4 Donald C. Hambrick & Eric M. Jackson, Outside Directors With a Stake: 
The Linchpin In Improving Governance, 43 CAL. MGMT. REV. 108, 110 (2000). 
 5 See generally Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The 
Determinants of Board Composition, 19 RAND J. OF ECON. 589 (1988). 
 6 See RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE 
IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOS 82-91 (2002). See generally MICHAEL 
USEEM, THE INNER CIRCLE (1984). 
 7 For a review, see J. Richard Hackman, Group Influences on Individuals in 
Organizations, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 199 
(M.D. Dunette & L.M. Hough eds., 1992).  
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influences on individuals, as well as factors that emerge purely 
at the group level and through the group’s situation in a wider 
social context shape members’ behaviors, beliefs, and attitudes. 
Our argument is that in order to understand the factors 
contributing to board culture and board outcomes—whether 
dysfunctional or functional—we must treat boards as complex 
social systems, and use the group as the basic unit of analysis 
when we study them. We must understand both the factors 
that are driven by group dynamics and culture and those that 
result from environmental influences on the board. 
We acknowledge that several organizational scholars 
have indeed already approached boards as social systems, 
bringing a behavioral perspective to boards research. Lorsch 
and MacIver produced one of the earliest qualitative studies of 
directors describing the subtle mechanisms shaping behavior 
in board rooms and how the resulting conditions can yield both 
active and passive boards.8 William Ocasio explored how 
institutionalized action shapes board outcomes in CEO 
succession.9 Edward Zajac and James Westphal collaborated on 
several studies exploring how power dynamics, interlocks, 
director reputation, and demography shape board outcomes.10 
Mark Mizruchi studied the power relations between boards of 
directors and management to explain how these manifested 
themselves in control over corporations.11 Finally, network 
studies conducted by Gerald Davis among others revealed how 
the interlocked nature of the director community shapes the 
diffusion of ideas and practices among boards.12  
Recognizing these important contributions, our aim here 
is simply to call attention to some of the significant ways in 
which boards function as social systems, and more specifically 
  
 8 See generally JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR 
POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS (1989). 
 9 See William Ocasio, Institutionalized Action and Corporate Governance: 
The Reliance on Rules of CEO Succession, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 384, 389 (1999). 
 10 See generally Edward J. Zajac & James D. Westphal, Director Reputation, 
CEO-Board Power, and the Dynamics of Board Interlocks, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 507 (1996); 
Edward J. Zajac & James D. Westphal, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, 
Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 60 (1995). 
 11 See Mark S. Mizruchi, Who Controls Whom? An Examination of the 
Relation between Management and Board of Directors in Large American Corporations, 
8 THE ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW 426 (1983). 
 12 See Gerald F. Davis & Henrich R. Greve, Corporate Elite Networks and 
Governance Changes in the 1980s, 103 AM. J. OF SOC. 1, 12-14 (1997). See generally 
Gerald F. Davis, Agents without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill through the 
Intercorporate Networks, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 583 (1991). 
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as groups. Because it is a review piece, our paper benefits from 
the flexibility to incorporate examples from recent corporate 
governance scandals, drawing together theory and practice. 
We begin in Part II with a brief review and critique of 
agency theory, the dominant theoretical approach that now 
underlies corporate governance research in both finance and 
law. Because we find these individualistic conceptualizations 
problematic, in Part III we look outside the economic and legal 
literature and incorporate some of the tools developed in 
organization theory that explain board behavior. We apply 
these theoretical tools to some of the better-known cases of 
corporate malfeasance. Finally, in Part IV we discuss the 
implications of this approach for the future of governance 
research, particularly in light of recent environmental factors 
that now affect corporate boards. 
II.  AGENCY THEORY  
A.  What is Agency Theory? 
More than any other approach, agency theory has 
focused on board room dynamics and the fundamental nature 
of the factors driving director behavior. Although this approach 
has spawned hundreds of articles and its conceptual language 
is now widely used by scholars and practitioners alike, our 
purpose here is to explore only two of its key assumptions 
regarding director behavior. First, agency theory 
conceptualizes the etiology of director behavior at the 
individual level. Second, even when an agency perspective 
considers the board as a unit, boards are treated as mere 
aggregations of individual director behavior as opposed to 
complex social groups.  
In the United States, all large public companies have a 
board of directors that is approved by the shareholders.13 
Legally, the board of directors is vested with enormous 
decision-making power over the activities of the company. In 
large companies, directors often delegate decision-making to 
corporate executives. Even when such delegation occurs, 
however, the ultimate power rests with directors. Almost all 
existing governance theory produced by economists, which has 
  
 13 See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK 
OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).  
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had the dominant influence on law, defines the relationship 
between directors and shareholders as one instance of an 
agency relationship.14 The firm itself is described as a legal 
fiction that serves as a nexus of individual contracts.15 
This definition of the firm is critical to agency theory 
because it suggests the relationship between individuals and 
the firm is fundamentally a contractual one. An agency 
relationship is thus a contract under which one or more 
principal(s) (e.g., shareholders) engage an agent (e.g., directors) 
to perform some service on their behalf by delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent. Because directors and 
shareholders are unique individuals, it is hypothesized that 
their respective interests will diverge. Consequently, 
shareholders will take the necessary means to ensure that 
directors will act in ways concomitant with their interests. 
Much of the research in this area involves identifying the 
means, and the efficacy of those means, by which this 
convergence of interests is achieved.  
This research has translated into many individual-
oriented reforms. Boards have adopted partial stock option 
compensation for directors in order to align directors’ interests 
with those of shareholders. Director independence 
requirements have been formulated primarily with regard to 
preventing individual directors from having conflicts of 
interest. Qualifications for committee membership, and audit 
committee membership in particular, have become clearer and 
more demanding so as to ensure that individuals possess the 
expertise and knowledge required for the position. 
B.  Why Agency Theory is Problematic 
Is it realistic or useful to view the modern corporate 
board as comprising only, or even principally, a set of 
individual contracts? We think not, and we argue that the 
radical individualism embedded in this contractualist view is 
unreasonable. It blinds us to most of those features of modern 
boards that are distinctive and in accordance with directors’ 
  
 14 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 
305 (1976); Michael C. Jensen, The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of 
internal control systems, 48 J. FIN. 831 (1993). 
 15 See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 14. 
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own empirical experiences.16 For example, R.C. Clark notes that 
most of the particular rules that make up the relationships 
among corporate officers, directors, and stockholders—that is, 
the relationships that give operational meaning to the concept 
of the corporation—are not the products of individual 
contracts.17  
Some readers may concede that while a large firm is not 
a nexus of individual contracts in a strict definitional sense, the 
distinction is insignificant given that we can still analyze 
boards or firms usefully as if there were actual contracts in 
action. We believe such a response is inadequate. Viewing the 
board as an instance of individual contracting may have at 
least two objections. First, this individualistic and 
undersocialized view of boards, while consistent with agency 
theory and economic explanations of human behavior, has 
proven to be inadequate when evaluated vis-à-vis the autopsies 
of recent corporate misconduct. Moreover, it does not reflect the 
real nature of board behavior. Second, academic research could 
help a great deal in improving corporate governance, but a 
narrow individualistic approach may make it difficult to realize 
this potential contribution. Answering the question of how we 
are to understand directors’ behavior in boardrooms requires 
not only locating the etiology of their behavior, but also 
developing defensible premises about director behavior that 
can guide theory building and focus empirical investigation. As 
Jeffrey Pfeffer and his colleagues have noted, assumptions 
about human behavior tend to become self-fulfilling: 
To the extent people believe in a particular theory, they may create 
institutional arrangements based on the theory that thereby bring 
the theory into reality through these practices and institutional 
structures. To the extent people hold a theory as true, they will act 
on the basis of the theory and expect others to act on that basis also, 
creating a normative environment in which it becomes difficult to 
not behave on the basis of the theory because to do so would violate 
some implicit or explicit expectations for behavior. And to the extent 
that people adhere to a theory and therefore use language derived 
from and consistent with the theory, the theory can become true 
because language primes both what we see and how we apprehend 
  
 16 See generally COLIN B. CARTER & JAY W. LORSCH, BACK TO THE DRAWING 
BOARD: DESIGNING CORPORATE BOARDS FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (2004); LORSCH & 
MACIVER, supra note 8.  
 17 See Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS 
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 60 (R. Zeckhauser ed., 1985).  
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the world around us, so that talking using the terminology of a 
particular theory also makes the theory become true.18 
In the next section we call attention to some of the 
important ways in which board outcomes may be shaped by 
mechanisms that operate within groups. Specifically, we will 
highlight the importance of group norms on individual director 
behavior, the effect of social influence on the way directors 
interpret information, the effect of group membership on 
directors’ attitudes, and finally the potential effect of habitual 
routines that develop at the group level and compromise 
mindful group decision-making. While these group mechanisms 
will be familiar to students of organizational theory, they have 
yet to penetrate the dominant law and economic perspective 
that continues to inform corporate governance research and 
legislation. Indeed, even within organizational research, many 
concepts specific to group behavior have not been applied to 
work on governance and boards of directors. 
III.  BOARDS AS SOCIAL GROUPS 
Social influence in groups and through groups is 
extremely powerful in shaping the behavior of both members 
and non-members. A group environment influences how people 
behave, what they believe, and how they feel.19 The board 
environment is no different. Despite meeting episodically and 
infrequently, boards are groups in a truly psychological and 
sociological sense. Boards have clear boundaries, with 
membership that is stable over time and readily identifiable by 
both members and non-members. A board’s members are 
engaged in a common task that requires sharing information 
and making joint decisions, and this task is ongoing and does 
not end when the board is not in session. Finally, directors 
interact face to face at least part of the time.20 
  
 18 See Fabrizio Ferraro et al., Economic Language and Assumptions: How 
Theories Can Become Self-Fulfilling, 30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. (forthcoming 2005). 
 19 See Hackman, supra note 7, at 1. 
 20 See J. RICHARD HACKMAN, LEADING TEAMS: SETTING THE STAGE FOR GREAT 
PERFORMANCES 41-59 (2002) (discussing the essential features of teams in the work 
setting); Donald C. Hambrick, Top Management Groups: A Conceptual Integration and 
Reconsideration of the “Team” Label, 16 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 171, 188-89 
(1994). 
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A.  Board Cohesiveness 
Importantly, boards have several characteristics that 
make them highly cohesive groups. This is crucial because, as 
social psychologists have long recognized, social influence of the 
kind that we will be discussing throughout the remainder of 
this paper is stronger in groups that are cohesive.21 
First, boards are cohesive because they tend to be very 
homogenous. Although this is beginning to change with respect 
to gender and race, boards continue to be homogenous with 
respect to age, occupation, class, and status position.22 This 
gives boards the likelihood of shared mental models, attitudes, 
beliefs, and experiences that contribute to group cohesion. 
Second, boards have high group distinctiveness, 
meaning that their membership is readily identifiable both to 
insiders and outsiders. Even when not face to face, the group 
membership is almost constantly salient given their names are 
often listed on websites and company documents and because 
the title “IBM Board of Directors” is synonymous with the list 
of names that comprise it. Contributing to the distinctiveness 
is the fact that membership requirements and tenures are 
clearly spelled out and that membership is stable. Indeed, it is 
rare that someone is expelled from the group. 
Finally, boards are small, ranging from ten to twelve 
directors. This makes them small enough for directors and 
interactions to be highly visible. Anonymous action is nearly 
impossible, and directors are aware of each other both as 
directors and as individuals. 
Cohesive groups, like boards, have the potential to 
realize benefits from diversity of ideas, skills and expertise, 
and to make process gains by operating more efficiently. 
However, they also have the potential for incurring costs and 
process losses.23 The gains and losses associated with group 
behavior are inherent in the very nature of boards, and must 
therefore be addressed in any explanation of board outcomes. 
  
 21 See generally Leonard Berkowitz, Group Standards, Cohesiveness, and 
Productivity, 7 HUM. REL. 509 (1954); Hackman, supra note 7, at 252; Stanley 
Schachter et al., An Experimental Study of Cohesiveness and Productivity, 4 HUM. REL. 
229 (1951).  
 22 See KHURANA, supra note 6, at 84.  
 23 See HACKMAN, supra note 20, at 169-75. See generally Norman R.F. Maier, 
Assets and Liabilities in Group Problem Solving: The Need for an Integrative Function, 
74 PSYCHOL. REV. 239 (1967). 
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In a recent Wall Street Journal article, Useem 
reiterated what many governance scholars have suggested 
before: although they are important, individual flaws like lack 
of expertise, prolonged tenure, and conflicts of interest (not to 
mention board level problems like inappropriate committee 
structures that governance critics like to harp on) will always 
be trumped by what ultimately happens when directors meet 
behind closed doors and are confronted with important 
decisions.24 What transpires there and over the course of 
meetings and telephone conversations cannot be reduced to 
individual or structural characteristics, but rather must be 
understood as the result of complex relationships of the board 
as a group. 
B.  How Groups Regulate and Shape Behavior 
Reflecting on board decisions gone awry, it is always 
striking that individual directors were able to sit by and not 
pursue issues that later turned out to be consequential. The 
board at Hollinger International Inc.25 approved more than half 
of the $400 million worth of transactions that Lord Black and 
his colleagues improperly pulled from the company. They made 
these decisions in infrequent meetings that were described as 
“brief, casual affairs,” some lasting no longer than an hour and 
a half. The board adopted behavioral routines like rapidly 
shuffling through and approving Lord Black’s proposed 
transactions, discussing unrelated and trivial but intellectual 
affairs during lunch breaks, and allowing Black to dominate 
and flatter directors into acquiescence.26 
These norms, and the behavior they created, came back 
to haunt the Hollinger board. Though Lord Black and his 
  
 24 Michael Useem, Behind Closed Doors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2003, at B2. 
 25 Hollinger International Inc., an international media conglomerate with 
ownership over publications like The Chicago Sun-Times, The Jerusalem Post, and 
formerly London’s Daily Telegraph newspaper, was recently the subject of an 
investigation and report that dubbed the company “A Corporate Kleptocracy.” CEO 
Conrad Black and other controlling shareholders are accused of funneling $400 million 
of company money, approximately 92.5% of its entire adjusted net profits between 1997 
and 2003, to a handful of top executives and shareholders through activities like 
creating bogus payments, self-dealing, and handing out excessive management fees 
and perks. See Barbara Shecter & Wojtek Dabrowski, “A Corporate Kleptocracy”: 
Black’s Ravelston Corp. Says Report on Hollinger “Laced with Outright Lies”, NAT’L 
POST (Sept. 1, 2004), available at http://www.canada.com/national/nationalpost/ 
news/story.html?id=f8cb6866-da43-4f3a-bf50-4852a795aa6b. 
 26 See Robert Frank & Elena Cherney, Paper Tigers: Lord Black’s Board, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2004, at A1.  
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colleagues also consistently misled and lied to the board, the 
board passively accepted a process that prevented judicious 
oversight—a critical failure. The Hollinger board’s practices 
seem negligent in the extreme. But less obviously harmful 
behavioral patterns with potentially similar consequences exist 
on all boards. 
Social norms, particularly in groups, are one of the most 
powerful forms of social control over people.27 Directors, like all 
members of groups, rely on norms as social indicators of what 
behaviors are, or are not, appropriate within the group context. 
Particularly within cohesive groups, which the Hollinger board 
had all signs of being, such norms are extremely difficult to 
challenge. As investigators discovered, Lord Black displayed 
consistent and profound loyalty toward his directors, offering 
generous donations to charities they supported, and often 
flattering them not only with perks but also with personal 
compliments.28 Having hand-picked the entire board, it was not 
difficult for him to mold the individuals into a group for whom 
the norm was to trust management, feel privileged by their 
membership among such an elite group, and not insult each 
other or waste valuable time with caution and skepticism. 
Groups tend to create norms around behaviors that they 
consider to be important to effective group functioning and 
performance.29 On boards these behaviors are likely to include 
the content and flow of board discussions, the sharing of air 
time among directors and with management, the leadership 
and power balance on the board, the effective use of 
information, the proper availability and use of expertise, and 
the structure of meetings. It appears that the Hollinger board, 
for example, had developed a norm of brevity and cursoriness 
that likely undermined each individual director’s freedom to 
interrupt or hold up discussion no matter what the reason. 
Other boards with which we are familiar have norms governing 
the interruption of management presentations, or the 
appropriateness of asking questions in the last half hour of a 
meeting. Still others have norms regarding director 
participation; some discourage full-board discussions while 
others require each director to provide an opinion on any given 
topic of discussion. 
  
 27 See generally GEORGE C. HOMANS, THE HUMAN GROUP (1950); MAZAFER 
SHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS (1936). 
 28 See generally Frank & Cherney, supra note 26. 
 29 See Hackman, supra note 7, at 235-36.  
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Whatever their nature, norms are extremely resilient 
once they have become established. Groups reinforce norms 
through sanctions and feedback to members who violate them. 
Ambient stimuli, the back-drop characteristics of the board’s 
surroundings and interactions (for example, how directors and 
the CEO are situated in the board room, what the board room 
looks like, and how directors speak to one another at a 
meeting) create a subtle but powerful normative inertia.30 In 
fact, ambient stimuli are often more powerful than the 
discretionary stimuli because they are “rarely noticed or 
discussed.”31 Instead, they function through directors’ implicit 
assumptions about what is appropriate based on the cues 
provided by the environment. 
If a group environment is characterized by formality, 
with directors sitting stiffly around a conference table and 
interacting only in formal language at predetermined times, a 
director with an important but loosely formulated idea would 
be unlikely to present that idea because he could not do so in a 
sufficiently coherent and formal fashion. Note that his 
withholding of the idea may be based on his perception of what 
behavior is appropriate or desirable, however, and not 
necessarily on any real evidence about what is appropriate. 
Unfortunately, this may often prevent ideas and processes that 
would be beneficial to groups from surfacing and becoming part 
of the group norms. Instead existing norms are supported and 
perpetuated since members are more inclined to surface 
perceptions through behaviors from which they expect positive 
feedback. Members are unlikely to test behaviors that they 
think may yield negative responses. Thus individual members 
can quietly hold false assumptions about the group that cannot 
be revised because no real information is ever exchanged.32 
One director’s recent comments reflect the impact even 
assumed norms can have on board room behavior: 
One of the good things, for all the unpleasantness associated with 
the post-Enron period, it is true that boards are much more assertive 
than they used to be. And it’s sort of like a natural change, they have 
to be, but they don’t have to do anything unclublike in order to be 
  
 30 See HOMANS, supra note 27, at 88-94. See generally Lester Coch & John 
R.P. French, Overcoming Resistance to Change, 1 HUM. REL. 512 (1948). 
 31 Hackman, supra note 7, at 209. 
 32 Chris Argyris, The Incompleteness of Social-Psychological Theory: 
Examples from Small Group, Cognitive Consistency, and Attribution Research, 24 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 893, 894-99 (1969).  
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that way. So that’s a good outcome. It’s expected, you know they’ve 
got to ask tough questions and expect answers. It’s hard to describe 
precisely, but back prior to this period and certainly in periods in our 
history, you really had to kind of stick your neck out if you were 
going to really object, even if there were good substantial reasons for 
doing it. It’s just that the norms were such.33 
By pointing to how external scrutiny has legitimated 
directors’ asking of tough questions, these comments highlight 
the extent to which being assertive in the boardroom can be 
perceived as undermining the board as a group or “club.” 
External influences, like those that resulted from recent 
corporate scandals, do not always occur and thus do not alter 
directors’ perceptions and experiences of norms. Absent these 
types of influences, norms usually persist over long periods of 
time. 
C.  Transmitting and Sustaining Norms 
The norms developed in groups are not only stable over 
time, but often survive even membership turnover. Unless 
there is a shock to the group, either in the form of individuals 
deviating from the norm or a change induced by an external 
investigation, norms survive even as the composition of the 
group changes. This resilience is the result of a number of 
important factors, some of which are reinforced by 
characteristics specific to boards. 
First, board membership usually changes incrementally, 
with no more than two or three new directors joining at a time. 
Second, new and inexperienced directors who have not been 
socialized into board culture and thus learn the behaviors 
befitting a board member primarily from those around them. 
One now very prolific director described his early board 
experience in the following way: 
When I first started going on boards I was the youngest thing in the 
board room. And so it was very helpful to me to talk to experienced 
directors. You know when I first started going to board meetings I 
wouldn’t say anything. And obviously I’d listen to the conversation. 
Because my mother always taught me to . . . if you go to a big dinner 
and there’s a lot of silverware and a lot of crystal and you don’t know 
  
 33 Katharina Pick, The Adoption and Framing of a Corporate Governance 
Innovation: How Directors Make Sense of the Lead Director Position (2004) 
(unpublished Ph.D. qualifying paper, Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences) 
(on file with author). All quotes from directors in this article are from directors of 
Fortune 500 companies to whom confidentiality was assured. 
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which one to pick up, just watch the hostess. So I spent my early 
meetings watching. And that’s a way to learn. And then you think “I 
would like to ask this question.” And then you see some guy who’s 
been there a long time who’s very smart and he asks the same 
question that you were thinking about. And that’s helpful to you. So 
that gives you some sense of confidence that you’re not exactly 
stupid. And then you hear a question that you really think is stupid 
and then at lunch some director will tell you “Wasn’t that a stupid 
question?”34 
Finally, because boards are so homogenously comprised 
of elites, the primary way in which people achieve status on a 
board is through tenure. This means that the people most able 
and likely to challenge norms (i.e., people of high status within 
the group),35 are the people who have been there the longest 
and are likely the most entrenched in the board’s norms. 
In order to explore the nuances and consequences of 
norms we must first understand why they are so important to 
groups. The enduring norms of a group are functional in 
sustaining two critical features of groups: the diversification of 
roles within the group36 and the achievement of uniformity in 
the group.37 Although these can appear to be contradictory 
forces, they are both critical to how groups achieve 
organization, order, and predictability in a way that maintains 
the group. However, both the tendency toward diversification 
and the tendency toward uniformity also have importance 
consequences for behavior in groups. 
1. Role Diversification  
Diversity comes in the form of role differentiation, 
which is clearly visible in the formal structure of boards. Here, 
committees and committee chairs take on additional duties 
with respect to specific areas of expertise. This role 
differentiation is also reflected in a board’s informal structure. 
A recent study on Lead Directors showed that even where 
  
 34 All quotes from directors in this article are from directors of Fortune 500 
companies to whom confidentiality was assured. 
 35 See generally O.J. Harvey & Conrad Consalvi, Status and Conformity to 
Pressures in Informal Groups, 60 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 182 (1960).  
 36 See Harold Guetzkow, Differentiation of Roles in Task-Oriented Groups, in 
GROUP DYNAMICS: RESEARCH AND THEORY 683-704 (Dorwin Cartwright & Alvin 
Zander eds., 1960); Hackman, supra note 7, at 215. 
 37 See Leon Festinger, Informal Social Communication, 57 PSYCHOL. REV. 
271, 272-73 (1950); Charlan J. Nemeth & Barry M. Staw, The Tradeoffs of Social 
Control and Innovation in Groups and Organizations, in 22 ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1989).  
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boards had not formally named a person to serve as Lead 
Director, there were individuals on the board who, in times of 
crisis or indecision, would be expected to assume responsibility 
or speak up on behalf of everyone else. Directors in most 
situations were confident that they could identify that person 
and that their selection would be consistent with the 
expectations of others. It is not surprising that many boards 
should have such informal role differentiation given their 
structure, where the independent directors usually have no 
formal leader with the exception of the CEO, whom the board 
is essentially evaluating. In these conditions an informal 
leadership structure is almost certain to emerge. 
Subtle role differentiation can become problematic, 
however, because when that particular person does not speak 
up, it is less likely that others will, even if they feel uneasy 
about an issue. This is generally the case because: (1) the 
unwillingness of the person to speak up establishes, informally, 
that concern is not required; and (2) it feels inappropriate to 
violate the implicit roles that have been established. This 
dynamic undermines the true function of boards of directors, 
which is to allow an opportunity for individuals with different 
ideas to come together and share information. In effect, group 
dynamics undercut the positive effects of diversity. 
2. Achievement of Uniformity 
Another reason groups develop norms, and one reason 
they are so resilient and consequential to particular outcomes, 
is because groups have a tendency toward uniformity.38 Norms, 
by bringing individual members together into a behavioral 
pattern, are one means through which uniformity is created in 
groups.  
On one hand, uniformity can be beneficial to groups. It 
produces order and predictability as well as a sense of harmony 
that enables the group to move toward its goals.39 It can 
prevent too much individualistic behavior from undermining 
productive discussions and make the group easier to maintain, 
for example when everyone in the group has bought into a 
common set of principles.40 
  
 38 See Festinger, supra note 37, at 272-73; Nemeth & Staw, supra note 37, at 
176-89. 
 39 See Nemeth & Staw, supra note 37, at 189. 
 40 See Hackman, supra note 7, at 214.  
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On the other hand, pressures toward uniformity also 
undermine the group’s willingness (and ability) to recognize 
and adapt to changing circumstances.41 In fact, we argue below 
that pressures toward uniformity actually can negatively 
impact board performance on a number of different levels. 
D.  Influences on Group Beliefs 
A popular criticism leveled by legislators and scholars 
against boards involved in recent corporate scandals is that 
they did not have the courage or the conviction to challenge 
senior management and/or the CEO on important issues. In 
fact, some have accused directors of being “indifferent”.42 While 
some directors, no doubt, have been indifferent, this sweeping 
generalization overlooks the enormous pressures toward 
conformity in group environments. Groups have a strong 
tendency to conform around ideas and specifically to 
congregate around those held by a majority within the group, 
often relying on consensus to signify accuracy.43 Boards are 
subject to the same conformity pressures. 
Observers say that even a lone dissenter can make a big 
difference in the board room. Bill George, former CEO and 
Chairman of the Board of Medtronic Inc., a leading medical 
technology company headquartered in Minneapolis, recently 
cited an instance in which all but one director on his board 
approved of a proposed acquisition. That one director 
telephoned George after the meeting had ended and made such 
a convincing argument for his position that George reconvened 
the board by telephone and together the directors decided to 
reverse their initial approval. According to George, the board 
eventually made the right decision.44 Unfortunately, social 
psychological research suggests that such persistence on the 
part of an individual member, and such deliberation and 
reassessment on the part of a group, are rare. In fact, studies 
show that, unless addressed deliberately through appropriate 
norms, the structure of group relations simply does not 
  
 41 See Nemeth & Staw, supra note 37, at 190. See generally Irving L. Janis, 
Groupthink, 5 PSYCHOL. TODAY 43 (1971). 
 42 See Useem, supra note 24. 
 43 See Nemeth & Staw, supra note 37, at 189. 
 44 Carol Hymowitz, In the Lead: Building a Board That’s Independent, Strong 
and Effective, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2002, at B1.  
 4/12/2005 6:33:47 PM 
1274 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:4 
encourage dissent and does not enable groups to handle it 
productively when it does occur.45 
1. Conformity 
There are two types of influence that generate 
conformity: normative influence, which happens when people 
try to gain approval by conforming to group expectations, and 
informational influence, which happens when people accept 
information from other people as “evidence about reality” and 
thus conform to their view.46  
The power of conformity via these two mechanisms is 
best demonstrated in a classic study by Solomon Asch in which 
subjects were asked to match the length of one line to “one of 
three obviously unequal lines.”47 Each subject was situated in a 
group of eight with seven confederates who each, when asked 
to state their answer aloud, provided the same incorrect 
answer.  
One third of the time, subjects responded in agreement 
with the confederates, providing the incorrect answer despite 
the fact that the correct answer was plainly obvious. When 
interviewed after the study, subjects provided three different 
explanations for their incorrect choices. Some said they were 
truly unaware that their estimates were distorted by the 
majority. Others said that the majority seeing it differently led 
them to doubt their own assessment and change their answer. 
Finally, some said they knew their own perception was correct 
but did not want to “appear different from or inferior to others.” 
Subsequent conformity studies have produced similar results. 
One striking nuance to the results is that the judgments 
groups converged around often tended to persist in people’s 
individual judgments even outside of the group setting.48 
Although we like to think of board members as highly 
experienced, independent, and empowered individuals, as 
  
 45 See Nemeth & Staw, supra note 37, at 185-89. 
 46 See id. at 183. See generally SHERIF, supra note 27; Soloman E. Asch, 
Effects of Group Pressures Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in 
GROUPS, LEADERSHIP, AND MEN (Harold Guetzkow ed., 1951); Morton Deutsch & 
Harold Gerard, A Study of Normative and Informational Social Influences On 
Individual Judgment, 51 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 629 (1955). 
 47 See generally Asch, supra note 46. 
 48 See Solomon E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and 
Distortion of Judgments, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 178-79 (Eleanor E. 
Maccoby et al. eds., 1958).  
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members of groups they are susceptible to the same pressures 
toward conformity that all group members are. Moreover, there 
are some features of boards that render members particularly 
susceptible to conformist behavior. Research shows that there 
are several conditions under which informational influence can 
be very powerful. 
First, members of groups are more likely to rely on each 
other in shaping their beliefs when the group’s environment or 
the stimulus for the group task is highly ambiguous.49 
Certainly, most situations directors face are highly ambiguous. 
The issues they confront are usually complex and subject to 
interpretation. They rarely face an objective reality and clarity 
regarding outcomes and costs. Instead, decisions they make 
require judgment about tradeoffs required to achieve various 
outcomes and often must be based on incomplete, complex, and 
subjective information. Moreover, directors must make these 
decisions while being conscious of the fact that they must 
answer to shareholders, even when it is not clear whether or 
not short-term tradeoffs will benefit those shareholders and/or 
the company in the long run. This ambiguity is even more 
pronounced in the tumultuous post-Sarbanes-Oxley and post-
Enron environment where directors are adjusting to new 
regulations, making sense of changing expectations, and are, in 
some sense, being cast in a newly conceived role that is more 
scrutinized than ever before. 
The second condition under which informational 
influence is particularly powerful is when the relevant group 
providing the information is perceived to be credible and 
competent.50 Boards are usually made up of very smart, highly 
influential, and experienced people. Moreover, directors are 
often predisposed to respect those serving on the board with 
them, especially when such people are hand picked. Perceived 
expertise also plays a major role, as directors are likely to defer 
to each other on items where they believe others have greater 
expertise. 
This relates to the final condition under which 
informational conformity is particularly strong: when a person 
  
 49 Richard S. Crutchfield, Conformity and Character, 10 AM. PSYCHOL. 191, 
193 (1955). 
 50 See Hackman, supra note 7, at 222. See generally Herbert C. Kelman, 
Effects of Success and Failure on “Suggestibility” in the Autokinetic Situation, 45 J. 
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 267 (1950); L.A. Rosenberg, Group Size, Prior Experience 
and Conformity, 63 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 436, (1961). 
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believes him or herself to be relatively unqualified to make a 
particular judgment.51 Despite the fact that directors are 
generally highly qualified individuals, the flood of information 
with which they must work likely leaves them never feeling 
completely informed. Directors are often inundated with pages 
of information prior to board meetings. Given time constraints, 
directors are usually unable to process this information and it 
is likely that this could make a director feel as though he or she 
is not entirely “qualified” to respond and/or act. 
It is worth noting here that some characteristics which 
have not received sufficient scholarly attention might also work 
to encourage conformity and, thus, undermine the opportunity 
for dissent. Boards and board members are highly visible, 
despite the confidentiality of what happens in board meetings. 
The board has joint accountability and culpability in situations 
where the stakes are extremely high, where losses for 
shareholders can be in the millions and consequences for 
employees can be devastating. In addition, directors are also 
highly cognizant of the reputational effects, both within the 
director community and outside of that community, of 
misguided dissent or of any type of individual interference or 
failure in the board room. 
2. Suppression of Dissent 
It is not just the barrier to dissent that is problematic, 
but also what happens once dissent is expressed. Social 
psychological research shows a pervasive tendency for groups 
to follow the majority position, even when that position is 
erroneous,52 highlighting behaviors that the group may use to 
bring the views of the minority in line with those of the 
majority. These behaviors include increased communication 
with a deviant in a group,53 holding the deviant and his or her 
  
 51 See generally H.H. Kelley & T.W. Lamb, Certainty of Judgment and 
Resistance to Social Influences, 55 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 137 (1957). 
 52 See Nemeth & Staw, supra note 37, at 183. 
 53 See generally Leonard Berkowitz & R.C. Howard, Reaction to Opinion 
Deviates As Affected by Affiliation Need and Group Interdependence, 22 SOCIOMETRY 81 
(1959).  
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position in disdain,54 and rejecting or cutting off communication 
with the deviant if necessary.55  
It is worth noting, however, that minority influence can 
be very beneficial to a group, especially when the group is 
engaged in non-routine tasks where flexibility of thinking is 
important. Some research suggests that “majority influence 
causes systematic, but convergent processing of a message, 
whereas minority dissent stimulates consideration of an issue 
from multiple perspectives, even perspectives beyond what the 
minority proposes” in a way that benefits group outcomes 
particularly in problem-solving situations.56 Even where 
minorities exert some influence, however, it is rarely outwardly 
manifested. Members of groups often privately shift their views 
in the direction of the minority influence. While such private 
reassessment is encouraging, a public shift does not usually 
follow57 and thus the group remains under the guise of 
consensus and uniformity. 
3. The Costs of Conformity 
The consequences of this sometimes superficial but 
always compelling uniformity are significant. One potential 
cost cited by Nemeth and Staw results from the “common 
assumption that truth is correlated with consensus.”58 Groups 
may stick to a consensus view, even in the face of changing 
information, because consensus assures them their assessment 
or decision is correct. 
This process can lead to an escalating and eventually 
self-perpetuating cycle where critical thinking is swept aside by 
the momentum the group has developed toward uniformity. 
Janis labeled this phenomenon “groupthink,” where the pursuit 
of concurrence dominates group process and overrides realistic 
  
 54 See Charlan J. Nemeth & Joel Wachtler, Creating Perceptions of 
Consistency and Confidence: A Necessary Condition for Minority Influence, 37 
SOCIOMETRY, 529, 538-39 (1974). 
 55 See Nemeth & Staw, supra note 37, at 188. See generally Stanley 
Schachter, Deviation, Rejection, and Communication, 46 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 190 (1951).  
 56 Randal S. Peterson & Charlan J. Nemeth, Focus Versus Flexibility: 
Majority and Minority Influence Can Both Improve Performance, 22 PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 14, 15 (1996).  
 57 See Serge Moscovici et al., Influence of a Consistent Minority on the 
Responses of a Majority in a Color Perception Task, 32 SOCIOMETRY 365, 373-79 (1969).  
 58 Nemeth & Staw, supra note 37, at 189. 
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and critical thinking.59 In his analysis of the Bay of Pigs “fiasco” 
undertaken by President John F. Kennedy and his cabinet, 
Janis discovered a group characterized by strong conformity 
pressures and self-censorship, direct pressure on members who 
dissented, illusions of unanimity, and failure to search for 
information or explore alternative courses of action.60 Based on 
his observations, Janis suggested that groups like this tended 
to rush to judgment, assume invulnerability and morality in 
their actions, and make poor decisions. 
As mentioned above,61 the effect of conformity pressures 
and uniformity in general on group performance is especially 
consequential to boards because they are cohesive groups. 
Cohesive groups tend to exert more pressure toward even 
greater uniformity because members have positive feelings 
toward their groups and value the interpersonal rewards they 
get from membership. As a result, members usually do not 
want to jeopardize these feelings or rewards by dissenting.62 
This “affiliation” aspect of the pressure toward uniformity in 
cohesive groups highlights another important mechanism by 
which groups shape individual behavior—social identity. 
E.  Influence on Attitudes via Social Identity 
Group memberships comprise an important part of an 
individual’s social identity. Studies in social psychology show 
that even when the grounds for group membership are 
arbitrarily imposed, people often have affective, cognitive, and 
behavioral biases in favor of the group and its members.63 
Individuals tend to feel more positive about people in the group 
than about those on the outside.64 In fact, board members will 
often go as far as to believe that other group members are 
similar to themselves by virtue of their membership in the 
  
 59 Janis, supra note 41, at 440. 
 60 See generally Janis, supra note 41. 
 61 See supra Part III.A. 
 62 See Hackman, supra note 7, at 252. 
 63 See generally Marilyn B. Brewer, In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup 
Situation: A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 307 (1979); Richard 
Moreland, Social Categorization and the Assimilation of “New” Group Members, 48 J. 
PERSONALITY & PSYCHOL. 1173 (1985). 
 64 See Moreland, supra note 63, at 1173. See generally Jacob M. Rabbie & 
Murray Horwitz, Arousal of Ingroup-Outgroup Bias By a Chance Win or Loss, 13 J. 
PERSONALITY & PSYCHOL. 269 (1969).  
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same group.65 Individuals also behave in ways that favor other 
group members over outsiders.66 In addition, people tend to 
adjust their values and attitudes over time to fall in line with 
attitude norms of their membership groups.67 In other words, 
group memberships play a significant role in an individual’s 
self-definition. 
Social psychologists suggest that individuals look to 
groups both to maintain a positive self-identity68 and to reduce 
subjective uncertainty about self-concept, which includes their 
beliefs, behaviors and attitudes.69 The extent to which directors 
have similar attitudes about their duties, about the legitimacy 
of various accountabilities asserted by external parties, about 
what makes an effective group process, and about the group 
membership they share, may impact how the board makes 
decisions together.  
In thinking about group influences on attitudes and 
identity we must also consider directors’ memberships in other 
groups. Two groups in particular are likely relevant to the 
attitudes directors bring to the work they do on boards. First, 
in addition to being directors for specific boards, directors are 
also members of the wider population of directors. This 
population is densely connected through interlocks, with most 
directors serving on several boards at the same time.70 The 
changing environment for corporate governance has made this 
community even tighter as it becomes more bounded by 
opposition to external parties that scrutinize and attempt to 
exert influence.71 The broader population of directors now has a 
visible and distinct out-group, comprised of legislators, 
shareholders activists, and various other critics, against which 
to position itself. 
Directors are also members of groups in their various 
professional roles. For example, there is a sub-group within the 
  
 65 See Vernon L. Allen & David A. Wilder, Group Categorization and 
Attribution of Belief Similarity, 10 SMALL GROUP BEHAV. 73, 79 (1979). 
 66 See generally Vernon L. Allen & David A. Wilder, Categorization, Belief 
Similarity, and Intergroup Discrimination, 32 J. PERSONALITY & PSYCHOL. 971 (1975). 
 67 See generally Alberta E. Siegel & Sidney Siegel, Reference Groups, 
Membership Groups, and Attitude Change, 55 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 360 
(1957). 
 68 See John C. Turner, Social Comparison and Social Identity: Some 
Prospects for Intergroup Behavior, 5 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 9-13 (1975). 
 69 See Michael A. Hogg & D.J. Terry, Social Identity and Self-Categorization 
Processes in Organizational Contexts, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 121, 123 (2000). 
 70 See Davis, supra note 12, at 592-98. 
 71 See infra Part IV. 
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population of directors that is comprised of current CEOs. 
When this part of a director’s identity becomes salient in the 
board context, it is likely to shape his or her behavior in a given 
situation.72 Given that a primary function of the board is to 
oversee and evaluate the CEO’s performance, this particular 
role affiliation may strongly influence the director role. 
While economic theory describes directors who are 
motivated primarily by the economic incentives of membership, 
social psychological research suggests that there are more 
important reasons for becoming a board member. In fact, some 
corporate governance research suggests most directors join 
boards not for money, but rather for the sake of learning from 
their peers and contributing their expertise and experience to 
the management of other companies.73 Thus, in order to 
properly study board outcomes, we must understand not just 
the economic incentives of directors, but the benefits and 
incentives derived from being part of the group and the broader 
director community. 
F.  Habitual Routines 
A look inside one crucial board meeting at Enron 
Corporation, the now bankrupt energy company whose leaders 
concocted off-the-books partnerships, twisted accounting rules, 
and manipulated the energy market to inflate the company’s 
profits and siphon money into their own accounts, shows how 
even the most alarming signs of wrongdoing can be missed. On 
June 25, 1999, three days prior to their next board meeting, 
each director of Enron received a proposal in their fax 
machines for suspending the ethics code of the company. CFO 
Andy Fastow had asked for the approval of a self-serving 
partnership which required the suspension of the code’s 
mandate that “even an appearance of an improper transaction 
must be avoided” and that “no employee should gain separately 
from company service.”74 The subsequent board meeting was 
conducted by phone in less than one hour and was “jam-
packed” with important agenda items and topics requiring the 
board’s approval. Directors proceeded expediently through 
transactions and proposals and, although no committee had 
  
 72 See generally Seymour Lieberman, The Effects of Changes in Roles on the 
Attitudes of Role Occupants, 9 HUM. REL. 385 (1956). 
 73 See LORSCH & MACIVER, supra note 8, at 23-30. 
 74 See generally Useem, supra note 24.  
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vetted the suspension of the ethics code, it was approved by the 
group. This decision turned out to be a terrible mistake, as 
Fastow went on to add millions to his personal fortune by 
exploiting Enron and its shareholders. 
Habitual routines, in the terminology of social 
psychologists, can undermine the activation of careful and 
scrutinizing decision-making in situations like the one just 
described. “A habitual routine exists when a group repeatedly 
exhibits a functionally similar pattern of behavior in a given 
stimulus situation without explicitly selecting it over 
alternative ways of behaving.”75 Habitual routines are distinct 
from norms because they do not emerge from group 
assumptions about appropriateness and their enforcement does 
not involve a response to someone who deviates from 
expectations. Rather, these behavioral patterns happen to the 
group as a whole. 
Habitual routines can be both functional and 
dysfunctional for any group. First, because they function 
automatically in the absence of members’ conscious attention, 
they save the group time and energy, particularly in stable 
environments. Under such conditions, the group does not have 
to actively manage every situation but, rather, automatically 
engages in behaviors cued to a particular situation. Because 
the group is not actively assessing whether or not its habitual 
routine is appropriate in the given circumstance, however, it 
always runs the risk of failing to adapt to important changes in 
environmental stimuli. Specifically, the group may miscode a 
situation and proceed with a particular set of processes that 
are inappropriate to the situation and, thus, undermine the 
group’s performance. 
The 1982 crash of Air Florida Flight 90, as analyzed by 
Gersick and Hackman,76 illustrates the disastrous outcomes 
that can result when habitual routines govern group behavior. 
The data collected from the cockpit voice recorder reveal that 
the crew carried out its ordinary takeoff routine, including a 
confirmation that the “anti-ice” indicator was “off” despite the 
fact that the current weather conditions required that it be on. 
The sad irony was that the crew continued to comment as to 
the frigid conditions and difficult weather while carrying out 
  
 75 Connie J.G. Gersick & J. Richard Hackman, Habitual Routines in Task-
Performing Groups, 47 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 65, 69 
(1990). 
 76 Id. at 65-67. 
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their behavioral routine as if the conditions were dry and 
warm. The experiences of Flight 90 show how powerfully a 
group can be governed by its routines.  
Habitual routines govern a good deal of group behavior 
and are likely are vital factor when it comes to explaining 
board behavior as well. Perhaps it was reasonable for the 
Enron board to expediently approve the agenda items that, 
while important, probably resembled transactions they had 
discussed countless times before. This time, however, the 
directors were approving a suspension of their code of ethics, 
certainly not a routine matter and most likely one that was 
qualitatively different from anything they had done before. 
Because of the board’s habitual routine of disposing of agenda 
items, this distinct undertaking was not cued as something 
that required a reassessment of how the group would discuss 
and process the decision. 
Boards have been shaken up by the fallout from recent 
oversights like this. Experiencing failure or receiving an 
intervention are two of only a few factors that can make 
habitual routines salient and make group members aware of a 
need to recode certain situations.77 Indeed, even boards not 
beset by scandal are becoming aware of the pertinent issues at 
hand, and many of them are now reflecting on, and revising, 
their own organizational processes.  
A prominent director of a Fortune 500 company has 
noted how executive session processes can be reconceptualized 
when stimulated by new conditions. 
[T]his is where collegial process really worked, where somebody 
comes up with a thought that maybe is not even a prearranged 
thought in the person’s mind, he just says “well you know I’ve been 
thinking about this” . . . it sparks a comment from somebody else and 
then somebody else and then you come up with something. 
Sometimes it’s strategy, sometimes it’s nuance, sometimes it’s 
something we don’t like sometimes it’s something we do like.78 
Here, the director draws a contrast between an “old 
way” and a “new way” of doing things. The routines and 
processes directors once adhered to are currently being 
reshuffled and being actively shaped, most likely to the benefit 
  
 77 See id. at 83-89. See generally Meryl R. Louis & Robert I. Sutton, 
Switching Cognitive Gears: From Habits of Mind to Active Thinking, 44 HUM. REL. 55 
(1991). 
 78 All quotes from directors in this article are from directors of Fortune 500 
companies to whom confidentiality was assured. 
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of the process. As the external shock subsides, however, 
whatever processes boards adopt will reflect the same tendency 
toward routine that usually shapes group behavior. 
IV.  BOARDS IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 
As we consider the social influences that shape group 
behavior and board outcomes from within, we must not forget 
that boards are also embedded in a wider, social context—a 
complex and increasingly institutionalized environment. 
Corporate governance researchers in the 1990s recognized the 
importance of this environment to boards but focused primarily 
on the role of investors and their interests in driving board 
processes and outcomes. Although these issues are important, 
we believe there is a more subtle and more powerful 
environmental shift affecting boards. 
There is no doubt that boards have evolved from being 
practically impenetrable groups to being more easily pressured 
to adopt certain forms and functions to have legitimacy. In fact, 
an increasingly organized environment has, and will, continue 
to affect boards through its ability to exercise authority over 
how boards should work. It does this by creating a set of 
broader norms that are thought to improve governance and 
lead to expectations that must be met to establish legitimacy. 
Sociologists would term such an evolution the 
“institutionalization” of the board, an evolution that certainly 
will penetrate the group context of the board and add another 
dimension of social influence to those which have been 
described above. By institutionalization, we mean a range of 
influences, controls, patterns, and tacit understandings that 
make up the whole corporate governance field. Institutional 
pressures emanate from the relational networks of 
organizations that arise in the broader societal context. This 
includes many elements beyond the boundaries of any single 
board. It includes the consensual notions held by ordinary 
investors about what a board ought to be like, how institutional 
investors believe board members ought to behave, and the 
network of governance rating agencies seeking to influence 
board behavior and governance outcomes, among others. 
Concretely, the three domains effecting this 
institutionalization are the legal, the consultative, and the 
educational domains. First, legislators have just completed, 
through Sarbanes-Oxley, a prescriptive intervention more 
extensive than any that has come before, putting forth new 
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independence requirements, stipulating committee structures 
and frequency of meetings, and mandating director 
qualifications. Many of the recent actions boards have taken 
are efforts to demonstrate compliance to new legal standards. 
Organizational scholarship suggests that boards can easily go 
through the theatre of achieving legal compliance while doing 
little to improve the underlying quality of their governance. 
Compliance to legal mandates of what defines an independent 
director, for example, doesn’t guarantee psychological 
independence. The adherence to legal prescriptions does not 
necessitate that those principles are manifest in board 
behavior. Given the opaque nature of corporate governance 
activities, it is fairly easy for boards to adopt the structures 
that signal good governance on paper but are, in fact, loosely 
coupled to actual board activities. Requiring board committees 
to have a written charter does not ensure that directors will 
adhere to the spirit and not just the letter of that charter. As 
several commentators have noted, Enron’s board was upheld as 
a paragon of high quality, independent governance. 
The various intermediary institutions that have evolved 
with respect to corporate governance have been even more 
influential in shaping the language and the expectations 
around boards of directors. Ratings agencies scrutinize boards 
based on checklists of desirable structures and processes, 
implicitly linking conformance to these standards to board 
performance. A whole industry has emerged around peddlers of 
governance best practices, with scores of consulting firms 
opening corporate governance practices and offering both 
consulting and training programs to directors. Even the public 
relations firms have gotten into the game, recognizing how 
important it is for boards to communicate to shareholders and 
the media in a way that is in line with best practice and 
restores trust. Several PR giants, including WPP Group PLC 
and Interpublic Group of Cos. Inc., have devoted business units 
to corporate governance.79  
Finally, there is an emerging “professional” logic of the 
director position. Universities and business schools, in addition 
to consulting firms, have seen the need to develop executive 
programs for directors. Business schools are making an effort 
to include corporate governance courses in their MBA 
  
 79 See Vanessa O’Connell & Stephanie Paterik, PR Firms Get into Advising 
on Governance, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2002, at B1. 
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curriculum. Ethics courses have appeared in response to the 
corporate scandals, discussing director roles in corporate 
governance outside of explicitly director focused courses. Built 
into the educational process itself is a system socializing 
students to a particular set of norms, values and dispositions 
that are created simply by living in, and responding to, 
institutional expectations and the routines of the course work.  
As this continues, and as other influences including 
auditors and regulators contribute to professionalization, a 
stronger set of norms will shape board room behavior. Boards 
will be increasingly concerned with, and driven by, concerns for 
legitimacy. Thus far, and as evidenced in a recent study on the 
adoption of the Lead Director position, directors’ pursuits of 
legitimacy have been primarily concerned with the opinions of 
other directors on their boards and perhaps those of the wider 
population of directors, when it comes to signaling legitimacy.80 
As the environment around boards more effectively imposes its 
own set of norms, however, the ways in which boards function 
as groups will surely change to respond to what is seen as 
legitimate in that environment. 
We end our essay where we began, calling for a 
reconsideration of the dominant law and economics perspective 
about the nature of boards. Radical theoretical individualists 
will undoubtedly disagree and contend that all corporate 
phenomena can be reduced to individual motivation and the 
firm to a nexus of individual contracts. But this hypothesis 
does not adequately account for corporate behavior today, as 
several autopsies of corporate governance failures have 
illustrated. We have suggested that there is much to be gained 
by examining boards not simply as an aggregation of individual 
contracts, but also as a singular social unit. This road may be 
more arduous than the dominant perspective. Its research and 
study requires a detailed analysis of the social structure of the 
board and recognition of the complexity of motivations that 
underlie behavior. We believe, however, that this route is more 
analytical and empirically defensible than the current theory. 
We also believe it opens up tremendous opportunities for new 
types of research methods, especially qualitative research that 
emphasizes field work and interviews.  
 
 80 See Pick, supra note 33. 
